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Introduction
We have been involved in a European project 
comparing the political debate and regulating of 
the Islamic veil (see www.veil-project.org). Doutje 
Lettinga and I constituted the Dutch team. Our 
contribution is based on the work we have done 
for VEIL. All over Europe, headscarves, or more 
generally the veil, have become a controversial 
subject.1 One important insight we gained from 
comparing national cases is that the controversies 
over the veil are in reality not so much about the veil 
as about national identity. That is, about European 
states reconfiguring and reconsidering themselves 
as they are becoming increasingly more multicultural 
and multi-religious societies in a globalizing world. 
There are national differences in the response to the 
veil, but over time a convergence can be identified, 
which we find worrying because, in the end, it is 
limiting the space for Islamic women to choose 
whether they want to veil. We will illustrate our claim 
with data from our research on headscarf debates 
in France and the Netherlands, and conclude with 
some comparative observations with reference to 
Britain.
Dutch regulation is by and large accommodative, 
while French regulation has been prohibitive, 
culminating in the prohibitive laws of 2004 that forbid 
the wearing of signs or clothing, such as the veil, 
which conspicuously manifest students’ religious 
affiliations in the realm of public schools. In this 
paper, we present an analysis of the political debates 
on the veil in France and the Netherlands covering 
the time period of 1989–2007. We review how the 
problem of the veil was defined and discussed in 
parliament to get a better understanding of these 
national differences in responses to the veil, and 
also to see whether a change occurred over time. 
The Netherlands
While the regulation on veiling in the Netherlands 
is largely accommodative, we are seeing a gradual 
decrease in tolerance. An example of this occurred 
in 1999, when a teacher-trainee was forbidden to 
wear a headscarf in the classroom. This sparked a 
small opposition party, Groen Links (the Greens), 
to argue that it hampers emancipation if women 
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cannot wear their headscarf at work. Again, in 
2001, when a court clerk was refused to wear a 
headscarf, the Green Party’s MP, Femke Halsema, 
compared the headscarf to ethnicity, social class, 
or sexual preference. She claimed the idea that 
the headscarf might be a symbol of oppression is 
mistaken, as it is simply a symbol of identity. The 
underlying problem is the discrimination Muslim 
women face from mainstream society. Therefore, 
the Greens proposed that dress rules be adjusted 
so that Muslim women could participate in society. 
The right to wear a headscarf was confirmed in a 
policy directive in 2003.
In 2004, Stef Blok, the chair of the Commission 
Blok in charge of evaluating the integration policy, 
expressed the view which was dominant at the time: 
“The main point is that it is someone’s own choice. 
If you want to restrict it, you need to show good 
reasons for it.” Public neutrality was considered 
as an insufficient reason for restriction. It was not 
that the Dutch did not care about neutrality, but 
they did not perceive the headscarf as a danger to 
public neutrality. This view was laid down again in 
a policy document.  The preceding year saw cases 
in the courtrooms associated with the niqab. Two 
students brought a case before the Commission 
on Equal Treatment, which was then dismissed 
following the Commission’s judgment that a niqab 
is dysfunctional when teaching young children. 
However, in two other cases on the use of the niqab, 
the Commission on Equal Treatment ruled in favour 
of the women.
In 2005, right-wing politician, Geert Wilders, 
proposed a motion to the Dutch parliament to 
ban the burqa in public spaces. His proposal 
was strategically timed to be discussed during a 
national debate surrounding terrorism. The burqa 
became framed as a problem of security and 
public order. Liberal MP Frans Weekers said: ‘When 
people cover their face in public, whether this 
is with a burqa or with a balaclava, this seriously 
affects other people’s feelings of safety, and the 
concern for a civil public order involves that we 
do not tolerate such face covers.’ The burqa was 
also framed as a symbol of gender inequality within 
Islam. A right-wing majority in Parliament voted 
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through a motion supporting prohibitive laws on 
the burqa. In 2009, the government announced its 
plans to introduce regulations that would forbid the 
wearing of all types of garments which cover the 
face (including balaclavas) in schools, both public 
and private, for school-goers and visitors alike. The 
reasons given included issues on interpersonal 
interaction, communication, public safety and active 
citizenship. A  directive has been sent to Ministerial 
departments to prohibit this type of clothing in public 
offices as well. Wilders’ initial motion (to ban the 
burqa in all public spaces) was rejected because 
it infringed on equality and religious freedom, and 
was considered disproportional. This explains the 
more moderate law of the current government.
France
In 1989, three Muslim girls were excluded from a 
College in Creil. In what later came to be known as 
the Creil affair, the socialist government condemned 
the ban on headscarves. Some wondered if this was 
inspired by the displays of Dutch multiculturalism , 
but the Socialists had other reasons to oppose the 
ban. They agreed with the Right that the Republican’s 
promise of equality could only be maintained if 
citizens were treated as abstract individuals, instead 
of as members of ethnic-religious communities. They 
defended their belief that the school would liberate 
Muslim girls. Michel Rocard (then prime minister) 
said: ‘I don’t believe a pure authoritarian procedure 
to be very effective, and despite the militant lay-man 
I am, I don’t accept a repressive aspect to be the 
dominant face of laicité. Laicité wants to convince, 
to persuade and to be shining. That is the laicité 
that should be maintained in our schools. (..) The 
aim of our public and lay school is to welcome, to 
persuade, to integrate, that means, to realize the 
goals of education in another way than through a 
politics of a priori exclusion.’ The Socialists saw 
causes of the headscarf problem to include social 
deprivation and alienation, and they did not want to 
further isolate Muslim girls in their communities. This 
was reflected in their policy (see table below). 
During the 1990s, the Socialists gradually lost their 
trust in the integrative and emancipative power of 
the public school, as Muslim girls stayed unwilling 
to give up their veil and hence appeared rather 
unassimilable on this point. The fact that girls 
insisted on wearing the headscarf was no longer 
considered as stemming from marginalization, but 
framed as expressing separatism and political Islam 
and. the policy changed accordingly.
At the turn of the 21st Century, the Socialists agreed 
with the analysis of the Right and  the left-wing 
parliamentary groups Republic et Liberté  (RL) and 
Radicale, Citoyen et Vert (RCV) that some Muslims 
rejected integration, secularism and the Republican 
project of equality. These fundamentalist groups 
forced their ideology upon others and particularly 
Table 1. The Netherlands
Time and 
conflicts
Frame Policy
1999
t e a c h e r 
t r a i n e e , 
court clerk
Headscarf
Not allowing headscarves hampers emancipation  & 
integration, the problem is discrimination by society 
(Green Party). Other parties: Mainly framed as 
conflicting with neutrality, but not strong enough to 
warrant a ban. (but socialists associated niqab with 
gender inequality within Islam)
Right to wear headscarves 
in schools and civil service 
confirmed in directive 2003
2004
police 
N i q a b 
(students)
In general: right to religion trumps public neutrality 
except for certain functions (dress signalling authority, 
impartiality) (all parties except List Pim Fortuyn)
Policy document: confirms right 
to wear the headscarf, except 
for court personnel and certain 
police functions
2005-2007
Burqa
Burqa framed as security & public order problem and 
as a symbol of submission. Must be banned therefore 
(Geert Wilders Freedom Party, followed by majority 
in Parliament)
2009 law in preparation to ban 
burqa and niqab in schools, labour 
market and public transport
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threatened the freedom and equality of young 
secular Muslim girls. We can clearly see this 
diagnosis in a legislative proposal of 2003, in which 
some Socialists proposed to ban all religious, 
political and philosophical symbols from schools 
(law proposition no. 2096 put forward by Georges 
Sarre (PS) and signed by Jaques Desallangre, 
Jean-Pierre Michel, Pierre Carassus and Michel 
Suchod). Donning the headscarf was framed as a 
‘contestation of French values and culture’ (referring 
to gender-equality and the freedom of individual 
conscience), and ‘a rejection, often imposed on 
young girls, of the Republican and laic model of 
integration’. A growing communalism in the suburbs 
would contribute to this fundamentalism that 
fragmented the nation into separatist and potentially 
violent communities where the rights of women 
were being undermined. On March 15th 2004, the 
French government passed the law that banned the 
wearing of conspicuous signs of religious affiliation. 
Comparison and 
Contextualization
Why is veiling more contested in France than in 
the Netherlands? It is often argued that the French 
adhere to a strict interpretation of public neutrality 
because of their Republican tradition. French 
secularism developed not only as a mechanism to 
free the state from religious influence, it also was a 
tool to emancipate individual citizens from (Catholic) 
communities seeking to control their members. 
The French Republicans sought to secure national 
cohesion by integrating citizens into a public realm 
where they were to share the same universal values 
of equality, freedom and solidarity (Scott, 2007). 
In contrast to France, Dutch secularism sought to 
protect the freedom of religious minorities from the 
liberal state. Furthermore, secular (leftist) liberals in 
the Netherlands were forced to make a compromise 
with Catholic and Calvinist minorities over political 
and social life. In the late 19th century, these had 
established local and regional politically organized 
religious subcultures to oppose the liberal’s secular 
nation-building project, later joined by the social 
democrats that likewise had begun to organize 
parties, professional and leisure time associations 
(Kersbergen & Manow, 2008). This resulted into the 
segmentation of Dutch society along confessional 
lines, known as pillarization. Given this background 
it is understandable why veiling is more contested in 
France than in the Netherlands. The two countries’ 
responses to the veil follow from their nation-building 
process.
It should be noted, however, that even in France 
there was a time when politicians did not consider the 
headscarf as conclusively incompatible with the laic 
public school. After 2003, Dutch tolerance towards 
veiling declined. This was in a context in which 
Table 2. France
Time & conflicts Frame Policy
1989
Creil affair, 3 girls 
expelled from 
school
Headscarf in public schools conflicts with public 
neutrality (laïcité) & integration: symbol of 
alienation (marginalization) & gender: the laïc 
school liberates (socialist party) 
Council of State: headscarves 
not necessary incompatible with 
laïcité, if not acts of pressure, 
provocation, proselytism, 
propaganda 
1994
Several conflicts in 
schools, strike on 
behalf gym teacher 
(no headscarf for 
safety reasons)
Integration: headscarf symbol communalism, 
rejection French values and political Islam 
And a symbol of gender inequality (socialists 
now follow right wing (RPR) + Republican left 
wing (Groups RL, RCV)
Decree Bayrou: ostentatious 
symbols not allowed in public 
schools, room to negotiate 
about ‘light’ scarves, bandanas
2004
Commission Stasi 
installed
Same frames, but become stronger (2002 Right 
wing UMP majority in parliament) + decree 
Bayrou ineffective, for still many conflicts  
Stasi commission Law: 
conspicuous religious signs or 
clothing prohibited in public 
schools. Headscarves always 
conspicuous.
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new political players had made their appearance 
on the Dutch scene (Pim Fortuyn, Ayaan Hirsi 
Ali).  The integration policy was blamed as being 
too multicultural, allowing Islamic radicalism. This 
was at a time when Islamic violence had not only 
manifested itself internationally, but also on Dutch 
soil. Dutch film maker Theo van Gogh was murdered 
by a radical fundamentalist in 2004. In this climate, 
Dutch politicians felt the necessity, it appears, to 
distance themselves from multiculturalism. Re-
assertion of Dutch national identity and Dutch 
values became a theme. One way of doing this 
was by making a firm stand against the burqa. 
The change in attitude of Dutch politicians towards 
veiling that likened the Dutch political debate to the 
French debate was a reconfiguration of the Dutch 
ideal of a multicultural and multi-religious society in 
a globalizing world. The consequences for Muslim 
women were limitations on their freedom to wear the 
veil, due to manifestations of Dutch policy.
We did not research the British veil debates (see 
Kilic, 2008), and therefore limit ourselves to just a 
few comparative observations regarding Britain. 
In the literature on citizenship and immigrant 
integration, Britain and the Netherlands are usually 
lumped together as two multicultural countries and 
contrasted with France as an example of a civic 
assimilationist or universalist integration regime 
(see Koopmans et al., 2005). When we look at these 
countries through the lens of state-church relations, 
France gets characterised as following a model of 
strict secularism and the Netherlands as a case of 
principled pluralism. State neutrality means in the 
Dutch context of pillarization that the state does not 
ban religion from the public sphere, as in France, 
but that it does not discriminate between religious 
and non-religious institutions. Therefore, religious 
groups not only have the right to establish their own 
schools, but also receive full public funding. This 
gave Muslims and other newly-established religious 
minorities the opportunity to make  religious claims 
and get them accommodated. Treating Islam 
differently from the established religions would 
amount in Dutch eyes to discrimination. The UK is an 
altogether different case, as the Church of England 
is the established religious authority in England, but 
not for the rest of Britain. Yet despite the decline of 
formal ties between Parliament and the Church of 
England, there exist comparatively strong formal 
and legal ties between church and state. The British 
Monarch also represents the head of the church 
and has considerable authority in church affairs, 
such as the power to appoint archbishops. The 
church itself continues to have an important political 
role in the workings of the state, as some bishops 
have reserved seats in the House of Lords (see 
Monsma & Soper, 1997 and Fetzer & Soper, 2005). 
How this affects the space for the religious claims of 
Muslims, and in particular, how this plays out in the 
framing and regulating of the veil is not so obvious. 
First, the big difference with both France and the 
Netherlands is that in these two countries there are 
legal rules which restricts, in the case of France, or 
accommodates, in the case of the Netherlands, the 
wearing of the veil, while in Britain there is no formal 
regulation. There exists a rather accommodative 
or laissez-faire practice as Kilic (2008: 444) calls it 
towards the veil. Secondly, until 2006 when former 
Foreign Affairs Minister Jack Straw publicized his 
article (‘I want to unveil my views on an important 
issue’, The Lancashire Telegraph, 6 October 2006) 
in which he expressed his discomfort with women 
wearing niqabs (a garment that covers the face, 
but leaves the eyes uncovered), Britain had not 
experienced a widespread public debate on veiling 
(Kilic 2008: 434). Given the privileged position of 
the Church of England as the established religious 
authority, the absence of a public debate and the 
accommodative practice is surprising as one would 
expect that the space for Muslims’ religious claims 
would be limited in Britain.  This is the more so if one 
realizes that the multicultural framework in Britain 
is set by the Race Relations Act that determines 
the space for recognition of minority claims. As 
Muslims are considered a religious group, and not 
as a racial or ethnic group like Jews or Sikhs, this 
works to the disadvantage of Muslims (Modood 
2006). Yet this is not reflected in debates or 
policies regarding the veil. Up to this day, veiling 
in the UK is relatively uncontested and the policy 
reaction accommodative. While we were inclined 
on the basis of our comparison between France 
and the Netherlands to conclude that the framing 
and regulating of the veil is more determined by a 
country’s self image as a nation and the way state-
church relations are institutionalised in the nation-
building process than by its integration regime, 
this explanation certainly will not do for Britain, but 
neither is an explanation in terms of integration 
regimes.
Notes
1. We will use ‘the veil’ as a shorthand to refer to all 
forms of Muslim women’s head- and body- covering 
together, such as chador, jilbab or niqab. When we 
want to refer to a specific form of veiling, such as 
the headscarf or the burqa, this will be mentioned 
as such.
2. Fortuyn had founded his List Pim Fortuyn (LPF) in 
February 2002. After his assassination in May 2002 
his party gained a huge election victory (26 seats in 
Parliament). Hirsi Ali was in 2003 elected as a MP for 
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the Dutch liberal party. She castigated Islam for its 
gender inequality. They were later followed by Geert 
Wilders, a dissident member of the liberal party who 
formed in 2004 his Patij voor de Vrijheid (Party for 
the Freedom) and by Rita Verdonk, again a former 
liberal MP who founded her movement ‘Trots op 
Nederland’ (Proud of the Netherlands) in 2007.
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